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Abstract: This paper aims to better understand board task performance according to firms’ and their boards’ need to change 
and adapt with the firms’ changing strategic circumstances. Results from case studies of six Tunisian SMEs revealed a range 
of board functions grouped according to four typical board governance roles of control, strategy, service and mediation. The 
types of board involvement in firm decision making ranged from a passive board classified as a “legal fiction” to a fully active 
“pilot” board type depending on the relationship between the board and the CEO/founder and the firm's circumstances. 
SME governance under was found to encompass simultaneously all four board roles (which we term a “portfolio” of board 
roles) but emphasis was placed by boards on one or two key roles according to the changing strategic demands of the firm. 
This finding gives initial support to the board role portfolio concept as justification for boards in SMEs.  It also has practical 
implications for how boards can best add strategic value to their firms when transitioning through challenges of 
transformational change in their development over time.  
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1. Introduction 
Extensive debate surrounds the value, purpose and roles of boards of directors in small and medium sized firms 
(SMEs) (Filatotchev and Wright 2005; Jonsson 2005; Huse and Zattoni 2008; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Zahra 
and Pearce 1989).  Changes in a board’s role over time are accepted as relative to changing firm circumstances 
(Jonsson 2005; Lynall et al. 2003) and are reflected in growing demands on boards (Huse 2007), as well as arising 
from the increasingly complex nature of modern business. This paper examines the different roles that SME 
boards may play in different firm circumstances.  Specifically, we study changes in board roles accompanying 
the complex phenomena associated with SMEs confronted with transitional challenges as they progress along 
their developmental pathways.  
 
The role of a board in an SME has been based primarily on the statutory requirements of boards in large, publicly 
listed firms. This conceptualisation has been criticised in the literature on various grounds, not the least being 
that there is a great deal of heterogeneity among SMEs and a one-size approach to the role of a board in this 
context is thus inappropriate.  
 
An underlying assumption in SME board governance is that an unlisted SME can benefit from having a board of 
directors. In reality, acceptance of the idea of a board being necessary and/or desirable for a small firm often 
meets with strong resistance or outright rejection by a powerful owner/founder/CEO who may perceive a board 
and sharing of power and control as a direct threat (e.g. Daily and Dalton 1992; Osborn 1991). Nevertheless, a 
particular stage in a firm's growth may signal the requirement for establishing a formal board of directors and 
the resolution of issues of power at the governing apex of the firm (e.g. Flameholtz and Randle 2007; Dekker et 
al. 2015). 
 
The literature has paid some attention to the type of role an SME board can play to add value to the firm, based 
mainly on resource dependency theory and stewardship theory.  However, there is a lack of consensus beyond 
the recognition that whatever role is adopted by an SME’s board, it will of necessity change as the firm’s 
circumstances change.  Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) noted that existing theorisations based variously on 
agency theory, agency versus stewardship theory, control versus collaboration, or the control, service and 
resource functions of the board, portray inadequately the conduct and practices they observed in boardrooms.  
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This highlights a need for a holistic, integrated consideration of board roles which is consistent with 
organisational objectives, and is more indicative of the reality within which boards operate, especially in SMEs.   
 
Analysis of board role literature suggests that boards perform not just a single role but all four roles: control, 
service, strategy (Huse and Zattoni 2008; Johnson et al. 1996; Voordeckers et al. 2007; Zahra and Pearce 1989) 
and mediation (Blair and Stout 2001; Lan and Heracleous 2010). In combination, they can be thought of as a 
“portfolio” of board roles. By portfolio we mean the collection of main roles played by the board in carrying out 
its fiduciary and governing duties. 
 
We conducted six case studies among small Tunisian firms. Data was gathered primarily from 26 semi-structured 
interviews with at least three directors from each firm, including the CEO/owner. The results revealed a range 
of board functions grouped according to four typical roles of control, strategy, service and mediation. The types 
of board involvement in firm decision making ranged among the case firms from a passive board classified as a 
“legal fiction” to a fully active “pilot” type of board depending on the relationship between the board and the 
CEO/founder and the firm's circumstances. We identified characteristics and dynamics associated with 
transitions through phases of revolutionary and/or rapid change and/or growth which indicated the most 
valuable type of board role for each transition.  We contribute, thus, to theory on board role approaches, and 
also to governance practice in SMEs by offering potential guidance to firm leaders for successful navigation 
through transitional crises.  
 
We conclude the paper by specifying our research agenda and setting out suggestions for further research to 
further develop a theoretical framework based on our empirical findings. 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1 Board roles in SMEs: A portfolio perspective 
The wider corporate governance literature from which the SME governance literature derives identifies a variety 
of different roles that boards of directors may adopt in decision-making.  The control, service and strategy roles 
have emerged in this literature as the principal board roles and these have been studied from a variety of 
theoretical perspectives (Zahra and Pearce 1989; Gopinath, Siciliano and Murray 1994; McNulty and Pettigrew 
1999). Stakeholder theory and team production theory have indicated a fourth board role of mediation among 
multiple stakeholder coalitions with divergent and/or competing interests (Corbetta and Salvatto 2004; van Ees, 
Gabrielsson and Huse 2009).  
 
Table 1 summarizes the main theoretical perspectives derived from the literature, as well as associated board 
characteristics and role focus.  
Table 1: Main theoretical perspectives 
Theory Board characteristics Board Roles 
Agency theory  
Controlling body 
Monitoring 
Compliance, conformance and external 
accountability 
Stakeholder theory/ 
Team production theory 
 
Integrating body 
Arbitration, mediation and interface with 
stakeholders  (alignment of interests) 
Strategic leadership 
theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Directing body 
 Leading and guiding strategic direction 
Establishing organisational culture (values, ethical 
conduct, ethos) 
Advising and counselling management 
Upper echelon theory  Shaping major organizational outcomes 
Influencing the process of strategic choices 
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Theory Board characteristics Board Roles 
Stewardship theory  
 
 
Supporting 
body 
Legitimizing managers 
Empowering managers 
Providing key expertise 
Cognitive perspectives Providing key expertise (decision support) 
Acting as decision making experts 
Managerial hegemony 
theory 
 Advising and counselling management 
Providing key expertise (decision support) 
Resource dependence 
theory 
 
 
Connecting body 
Procuring external resources 
Managing environmental uncertainty 
Social network theory Making connections through key relationships 
Adapted from Karoui (2009)     
 
By integrating within a portfolio conceptualisation the various roles presented in the table we argue that such 
theoretical pluralism provides a more adequate approach to understanding the board’s multiple obligations, 
especially in an SME context. In this conceptualisation the portfolio of board roles involves linking, supporting, 
integrating, monitoring and directing tasks where the board acts as a provider, monitor, controller and arbitrator 
of key resources.  Rather than seeing the choice of role as a single function selected from the range of options 
as presented in Table 1, the portfolio concept promotes the idea that a board may select and play simultaneously 
a combination of control, service, strategy (Demb and Neubauer 1992) and mediating (Blair and Stout 2001) 
roles but emphasise a particular role that matches the strategic requirements of the firm’s circumstances 
(Hillman et al. 2000; Pfeffer 1972; van Ees et al. 2009).  The combination of roles employed by the board will 
determine the relative emphasis in balancing the two governance dimensions of regulatory 
conformance/compliance and organisational performance.   
2.1.1 Control, service, strategy and mediating roles 
The board’s control role is consistent with the conformance (or regulatory compliance) dimension of corporate 
governance (Charreaux 2000). Derived from agency theory the board’s main role is organised around the generic 
concept of the monitoring function (Huse 2007).  This role emphasises financial control and monitors past 
performance through financial accounting methods.  The board’s control activities also include monitoring firm 
strategies, appraising the CEO’s behaviour and the executive leadership team’s performance, defining the 
executive remuneration policy and assessing the nomination and/or dismissal of executives and/or directors 
(Matheson 2004). 
 
The board’s service role draws primarily upon resource dependency theory. In this role the board makes three 
main contributions: legitimisation (Huse and Zattoni 2008), external linkage (Hillman et al. 2000), and 
information gathering, advice and counsel (Davis et al. 1997; Muth and Donaldson 1998). The service role may 
contribute to improved decision quality and therefore affect positively long-term firm performance.   
 
The board's strategic role (Zahra and Pearce 1989), includes encouraging discussion and debate, evaluation and, 
potentially, the initiation of strategic proposals.  In this role, directors may make a strategic contribution to the 
firm from their professional expertise and experience, in the formulation and refinement of strategies. In 
addition to articulating the firm's mission and setting guidelines for implementation and control of strategy, 
boards acting in a strategic role may also make a major contribution at critical decision points, such as 
acquisitions, divestments or takeover bids (Zahra and Pearce 1989).  
 
Team production theory (Kostant 1999; Blair and Stout 2001) explains why corporate boards should function as 
independent arbiters among corporate constituents who have invested in the entity. Boards are designed to 
play an intervening or mediating role between the enterprise and society and to help resolve competing claims 
on the corporation (Corbetta and Salvato 2004; Demb and Neubauer 1992). Boards thus have a dual role in 
shaping the corporate life-space as an intermediary between the corporation and three other governance forces: 
regulation, ownership, and societal pressure (Demb and Neubauer 1992; Short, Keasey, Wright, and Hull 1999).  
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The four board roles thus outlined (control, service, strategic and mediation), represent aspects of the board’s 
overall governance function. While a specific orientation or emphasis is indicated with each of the four roles, 
respectively, in practice the boundaries between each are less distinct. Rather than being seeing as the sum of 
the four single roles, we argue for a portfolio approach to board roles (Demb and Neubauer 1992). Each 
individual board selects a set of tasks most appropriate to the firms’ needs from among a spectrum involving 
monitoring and control, guidance and support, strategy formulation and implementation, and arbitration and 
mediation.  The portfolio approach is consistent with a strategic contingency view of the board’s role where 
directors’ involvement in directing the business will vary over time (Bonn and Pettigrew 2009; Lynall et al. 2003), 
as well as across the company’s evolution through its lifespan (Aguilera et al. 2008; Astrachan et al. 2002; 
Charkham 1994).  According to Zahra and Pearce (1989, p 298) “… boards are expected to perform qualitatively 
different roles at various points in the [firm’s] life cycle”.  Changing board roles are thus relative to changing firm 
circumstances (Jonsson 2005; Lynall et al. 2003), which are reflected in the growing demands on the board (Huse 
2007) and the nature of modern businesses.   
 
We thus suggest that as a strategic decision making group (Forbes and Milliken 1999) boards of directors need 
to adapt not only to both changing circumstances in their firms’ environments (Levie and Lichtenstein 2010) and 
in their internal complexity (Markarian and Parbonetti 2007), but they may also adopt a pro-active role in the 
transition process, driving and possibly even initiating strategic change for the firm (Bonn and Pettigrew 2009; 
Filatotchev et al. 2006). 
2.2 Board roles in SMEs: A contingency perspective 
In response to a lack of empirical support for single-theory models of boards and firm performance many authors 
have called for a multi-theoretic approach to research addressing boards and governance (e.g. Daily, Dalton and 
Cannella 2003; Lynall et al. 2003; Pye and Pettigrew 2005) to better understand how boards function in reality 
and to re-conceptualise board roles.  Researchers have been criticised for a tendency to generalise their findings 
across a population in attempting to find a universal “one-size-fits-all” solution to board effectiveness (Pye and 
Pettigrew 2005).  Attempts by researchers to fit the world of corporate enterprise into abstract categories that 
are remote from actual behaviour have also been criticised (Knights and Willmott 1993; Samra-Fredericks, 2000). 
Lynall et al (2003) contended that it is not a question of whether existing theories are helpful for understanding 
boards and firm performance, but rather, when each is helpful.  
 
In this study we combine and integrate a strategic contingency perspective of governance with the portfolio 
conceptualisation of board roles in our framework. We take into account both external and internal company 
contexts and, similarly, consider board roles as contextual in nature (Huse 2005; Strebel 2004). Such situations 
may include the institutional context, the industrial sector within which the firm finds itself, the firm ownership 
context, and its life-cycle stage. Corbetta and Salvato (2004) adopted a contingency perspective in examining 
board structure, activity, and roles in family businesses. They noted a high degree of heterogeneity in their 
typology of board composition due to various factors impacting on boards, such as firm mimicry, institutional 
pressure and internationalisation. Family and business cultures, which shape governance systems, also differ 
widely across geographical boundaries as well as over time and business life cycle stages (Astrachan, Klein and 
Smyrnios 2002; Corbetta and Salvato 2004). 
 
From a contingency perspective dynamic boards will adopt and fulfil the roles consistent with the strategic 
circumstances and requirements of the firm (Hillman et al. 2000; Pfeffer 1972). The view that board roles change 
according to firm circumstances (Jonsson 2005; Lynall, et al. 2003) is thus central to our theoretical framework. 
A particular situation which is often problematic in SME governance concerns the power relationship between 
the owner-founder/CEO and the board.  These dynamics will play out in the actual role played by the board. 
2.2.1 Shift in the balance of power 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) examined factors that affect board composition and how boards evolve over 
time.  They found that this evolutionary process depends on the bargaining power of the CEO relative to that of 
the directors.  They also noted that boards exist for a variety of reasons besides being the product of regulation, 
hypothesising that boards are primarily a market solution to an organisational design problem. With regard to 
board composition Hermalin and Weisbach found that closely held firms in which the founders remain active 
and where the CEO has a large ownership position tend to have insider-dominated boards.  In contrast larger 
and older firms are more likely to have professional management with small ownership stakes and outsider-
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dominated boards.  They found that changes in board composition are likely to occur after abnormally poor firm 
performance or a change in CEO, with inside directors being replaced by outside directors. 
 
Finkelstein (1992) identified several dimensions of power: structural, ownership, expert, and prestige, each of 
which may be relevant to the extent of their influence on board formation.  At the entrepreneurial stage some 
organisations will seek equity financing and this will often coincide with the formation of a board or a change in 
board composition.  Lynall, et al (2003) argued that various corporate governance theories will have differential 
applicability to board formation across different stages of the life cycle, and will also depend on the relative 
power of the CEO and financier.  Social network theory may have greater explanatory power at this stage when 
the relative power of the CEO/financier will determine whose social network the board reflects.  Resource 
dependency theory, in contrast, helps illuminate board composition in the intermediate stages of collectivity 
and cooperation and the formalisation and control stages of the firm’s life cycle, when CEOs have dominant 
power.  On the other hand, institutional theory will be particularly applicable to board formation at the 
formalisation stage when CEOs have relatively strong power, while agency theory will be more illuminating at 
the formalisation and control stage (Lynall et al 2003). 
3. Methodology 
Case studies were conducted among six Tunisian SMEs. The main characteristics of the case-firms are presented 
in Table 3.  Data was gathered primarily from interviews, and also from other sources including company and 
legal documents, company reports and publications, director networks, and media material. A total of 26 semi-
structured interviews were conducted between 2011 and 2012 with at least three directors from each firm, 
including the CEO/owner. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and an hour-and-a-half, yielding more than 20 
hours of audio-recorded and transcribed material. Most of the interviews were conducted in French, with some 
in English and Arabic and then translated into French. Transcribed interviews were categorised by theme 
according to the different tasks associated with each board role derived from the literature review (Bardin 1977; 
Miles and Huberman 2009) (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Tasks defining board roles from literature review 
Board activities Authors 
Control role activities  
Select executives  
Pearce and Zahra (1992) Monitor, assess, reward executives 
Protect shareholders’ interests 
Monitor financial statements Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) 
Monitor managers (hiring, firing, remuneration) Johnson et al. (1996) 
Approve managers’ decisions  
Hillman et al. (2000) Control strategy implementation 
Plan CEO’s succession 
Assess and compensate CEOs 
Strategy role activities  
Define the business model  
Pearce and Zahra (1992) Define firm’s mission 
Decide and implement strategy 
Service role activities  
Advice on technical element Whisler (1988) 
Advice CEO and managers Johnson et al. (1996) 
Represent firm’s interest  
Pearce and Zahra (1992) Link to firm’s environment 
Expand network for resources Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) 
Mediation role activities  
Build, maintain and work for actors’ consensus  
Kim, Burns and Prescott (2009) Reconcile conflicting positions 
Balance stakeholders’ interests Vandewaerde et al. (2010) 
The primary board role for each firm was established by counting the number of references made by the firm’s 
interviewees to tasks within the role categories. Interviewees were asked to concentrate on one strategic change 
within the life course of the SME and then describe the board role and/or its changes along with changes 
experienced by the firm.  
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4. Results 
The main characteristics describing the six case companies are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Case company characteristics 
Com- 
pany 
Com- 
pany 
Type 
Industry Owner- 
ship 
Type 
(Shares) 
Foun-
der as 
CEO 
Com-
pany 
Size 
(Staff) 
Com- 
pany 
Age 
Annual 
Ave. 
Rev- 
enue 
(€M) 
Board 
Size 
Board 
Com-
position 
Board 
Meeting 
Freq- 
uency 
(per year) 
TI Non-
Public 
IT 
solutions 
99% 
(CEO) 
Yes 49 1987 7 9 6 Family 
3 Outside 
2-4 
SW Private 
Subsid-
iary 
Con--
struction 
material 
merch- 
andising 
99% 
(Family) 
No 14 2009 1,2 7 3 Family 
4 Outside 
4 + 
informal 
prepara- 
tory 
SD Non-
Public 
Pharma-
ceutical 
51% 
(Foun-
der) 
Yes  1990 2 12 3 Family 
6 Friends 
2-4 
IN Non-
Public 
Plastic 
extru- 
sion and 
profiling 
93% 
(Family) 
Yes 268 1972 12.5 7 6 Family 
1 Friend 
1 
ED Non-
Public 
Real Estate 51% 
(Family) 
No 100 2002 4 6 2 Family 
5 Outside 
3-4 
AB Listed 
(2005) 
Auto-
mobile 
parts 
produc-
tion 
61% 
(Family) 
No 600+ 1938 30 10 7 Family/ 
Affiliated 
3 Outside 
4 + 
informal 
prepara- 
tory 
The following discussion outlines the board dynamics reported in each of the six cases.  
4.1 Case TI 
In this company a board of nine directors comprises six family members, three of whom are the CEO’s wife and 
two daughters, and three outside directors and is led by the CEO/founder. Rather than involving the board in 
decision-making, and especially strategic decisions, the CEO looks outside the firm for advice and consultancy. 
The CEO trusts only one of the outside directors who shares the same engineering school background, despite 
other board members being professionally qualified (in management and engineering). While the CEO regards 
director competences as important, there is neither apparent awareness of the diversity of directors’ skills on 
the board nor acknowledgement of the strategic contribution that a board may make.  To the CEO, having a 
board is simply a formality.  
 
The CEO is in a central and hegemonic position. The board of directors has undergone transformation over the 
years. Two major periods characterize the board’s dynamism, beginning with a dispersed ownership and one 
main financial institutional shareholder. However, a change in the composition of the company’s board has led 
to a shift of power from shareholders and directors to the CEO.  
 
The company uses a dual statutory audit, the first in accordance with the Commercial Code and the second 
informally. The move to this format has eliminated the involvement of the board in its oversight role so that 
over the years it has become passive and the CEO regards the directors as “irrelevant”. Conversely, the directors 
believe their board to be active, serving strategic and service roles.  The board has been retained but functions 
as a "rubber stamp" (Huse 2007), ratifying strategic decisions made by the CEO. 
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4.2 Case SW 
The company is a subsidiary of a large private group of about 50 companies in different sectors including banking, 
insurance, leasing, tourism, trade, industry, and health. Since the SME’s inception the board has played a very 
active role. This can be explained mainly by the recruitment policy for directors based on skill and experience 
and while still at an early development stage, the company continues to evolve strategically by intention toward 
sustainable profitability. The CEO/owner has deliberately constituted a board of directors with expertise and 
experience. The board is perceived by the CEO and its directors as an active advisory board playing all four roles, 
with substantial emphasis on strategic decisions for the business.   
4.3 Case SD 
The board's 12 directors comprise two family members, and 10 friends/affiliates. The board meets as 
determined by the CEO/chairman, between two and four times a year. Board meetings last four to five hours 
and while there is substantial discussion, which often strays into management, most decisions are made outside 
formal board meetings. The board is dominated by the CEO/chairman who makes all strategic decisions.  The 
board's focus is on control and monitoring and, according to the CEO/chairman, has no useful strategic 
contribution to make to the firm, serving as a rubber stamp for his decisions.  
 
While limited by the CEO/Chairman’s dominance, the other directors see the board’s role as service and strategy, 
serving as care-giver and controller. The directors believe they serve to challenge the CEO/chairman’s 
assumptions and often narrowly-focused position.  
4.4 Case IN 
Six of the board's seven directors are family members qualified in engineering, finance or economics. The two 
requirements for a director on this firm's board are family relationship and professional experience, with the 
firm’s management required to be in the hands of the family. While the board meets officially once a year, the 
justification is that because the directors are almost all family members and are involved in the company on a 
daily basis, formal meetings to discuss strategic and operational issues are superfluous.  
 
Decision-making rests with four family members who are the key advisors, three of whom are directors including 
the CEO, the founder and the chairman. To these three directors who control and manage the company, the 
rest of the board is seen as ineffectual and decisions are made outside formal board meetings. The collective 
group is important, however, especially for mediation of conflict among family board members. For this board 
the three dominant directors play all four roles but act primarily in a pilot role, while the remainder of the board 
acts as a rubber stamp. 
4.5 Case ED 
Of the six directors only one is a family member who owns a majority (51%) of the shares, the rest being 
dispersed. The board meets three to four times a year for two to three hours. While the CEO would prefer a 
greater frequency of formal meetings for important discussions, friendship ties developed over time among the 
directors mean that these meetings are informal.  
 
Board composition is based on skills diversity rather than family links and the directors have widely different 
backgrounds and sector experience, including audit, car sales, financial broking, archival, engineering, textile, 
and farming. The focus on diversity in director selection facilitates a primary advising, consultative role that 
supports management, while financial control is delegated to the managers so that board energy can be focused 
on strategic issues. The board is seen as a forum, a source of decision input and information sharing, and a 
decision-making unit for development of new strategic horizons for the company. While it also mediates 
stakeholder conflict over key strategic decisions, as well as performing the strategy and control roles, the board 
sees itself in a service role providing moral, logistical and financial support.  
4.6 Case AB 
The 10-member board comprises seven family or affiliated directors and three outside directors. The main 
selection criteria for external directors are professional experience, skills and diversity of ideas. While the board 
meets quarterly, “preparatory meetings” allow greater information exchange and interaction among directors. 
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Board meetings focus on strategy, company development and decision making processes, as well as monitoring 
and approving the financial accounts.   
 
The board is seen as not only useful but also essential, playing a crucial role in the company.  While the founder 
remains a key board member respected for his expertise and experience, a democratic leadership style 
predominates. Having transitioned from primarily a monitoring board where key decisions were made by a small 
core group, to a fully active, competent, well-functioning and effective board of directors acting primarily in the 
strategic and service roles, this transformation is reflected in the company’s development and its financial 
performance. The board’s role transition during the IPO phase also required it to act as mediator reconciling and 
balancing family shareholding and company interests. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Our findings shed some light on the complexity of SME board roles which cannot be explained adequately by a 
single theory independently from organisational context and value creation (Huse, 2000, 2005, 2007). Compared 
with Fama and Jensen (1983) who claimed that boards could exist for a purpose of value protection, our results 
(summarised in Table 4) show that even supposedly passive boards may play a key role in value creation.  
Table 4: Board role attributes 
Board 
Attributes 
TI SW SD IN ED AB 
Impact on firm No Yes Indirect Indirect Yes Yes 
Efficiency No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board 
dynamism 
perception 
Passive Active Passive Passive Active Active 
Convergence 
in directors’ 
role 
perceptions 
No Yes No No Yes Yes 
CEO 
hegemony 
Imposed 
and 
accepted 
No Imposed 
and 
accepted 
Perceived Perceived Perceived 
Leadership Autho-
ritarian 
Demo-
cratic 
Autho-
ritarian 
Autho-
ritarian 
Demo-
cratic 
Demo-
cratic 
Roles Discussion 
of strategic 
orientation 
All four 
roles 
with 
primary 
emphasis 
on 
service 
role 
Focus on 
control 
Focus on 
control and 
strategy 
All four 
roles with 
primary 
emphasis 
on service 
and 
mediating 
role 
All four 
roles with 
primary 
emphasis 
on 
strategy 
and service 
role 
Board roles in the case companies are shown to be varied and emerge from company circumstances.  For these 
firms the board's roles are based on decisions taken by individual directors (e.g. dominant CEOs or founding 
directors) and imposed on the board or made collectively by the board as a whole.  Board members in these 
firms have certain expectations about the board's tasks and its role.  These expectations may or may not be 
aligned with those of the CEO/founder. Nevertheless, the board has an impact, direct and/or indirect, on firm 
performance. Boards which are perceived to play only a rubber stamping role are still valued for advice, debate, 
mediation and challenging the CEO/founder. As such, the notion of the board as a legal fiction (Demb and 
Neubauer 1992) is misleading in these case firms. 
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Moreover, the idea of the pilot board as being fully engaged in all of the board tasks is also somewhat misleading 
for the SMEs in this study.  When the CEO/founder dominates the strategic decision making process, the board, 
while an active and key participant, plays a more focused role than theory suggests for the fully engaged pilot 
board. A key finding from our study is that due to SME heterogeneity, firm dynamism and contingencies, board 
roles will vary among the four main role types and will exhibit different task emphases depending on the 
characteristics of the firm and its development, the ownership structure and the relationship between the 
CEO/founder and the board. 
 
Our results show that in three of the firms where leadership is democratic and power is shared between the 
CEO/founder and the board, all four roles are played but with an emphasis on a particular role or a 
set/combination of roles.  These three boards' contribution appears to be the most valued and to have the 
greatest influence on the firm.  Directors in these three firms are selected for their competencies – whether or 
not they are family members or affiliates –complementing the CEO/founder's vision, drive and expertise. Our 
analyses show that board roles can be used in a portfolio configuration (IN, ED, SW, AB) or in a dominant single 
role configuration (SD, TI) even when classified as passive.  
 
We have argued that effective leadership will be commensurate with an appropriate shift in the balance of 
power from management to the board as the firm evolves and becomes more complex in its structure and 
systems, and when the board understands how it can best make a strategic contribution to the firm. Regardless 
of the stage in the firm's development, our results suggest that boards’ greatest contribution will be made when 
emphasis is placed on the type of role and requisite competencies that are consistent with the firm's 
circumstances and will shift in emphasis as the firm evolves. The three firms whose boards most closely 
demonstrate the portfolio role concept have adapted over time and appear to function more effectively than 
the boards in firms with autocratic leadership styles and limited board roles. The three firms where the board is 
perceived as active exhibit primarily a strong service role followed by a strategy role, whether or not the CEO is 
also founder. 
 
Our particular contribution to understanding board roles in SMEs is in highlighting that not only during periods 
of instability and crisis but also between such transitional phases that boards need to be cognizant of the most 
appropriate role for their leadership contribution.  This cannot be achieved successfully if the CEO/founder 
maintains a stranglehold on decision-making processes. The challenge for the board and the firm is to navigate 
through these states of punctuated equilibrium, where instability may mark a new phase of revolutionary 
growth.   
 
While further research is required to confirm and validate our findings, our study provides encouraging initial 
support for the portfolio concept which more adequately captures the role and purpose of a board in the SME 
context.  
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